We explore economic model of health behaviors. While the standard economic model of health as an investment is generally supported empirically, the ability of this model to explain heterogeneity across individuals is extremely limited. Most prominently, the correlation of different health behaviors across people is virtually zero, suggest that standard factors such as variation in discount rates or the value of life are not the drivers of behavior. We focus instead on two other factors: genetics; and behavioral-specific situational factors. The first factor is empirically important, and we suspect the second is as well.
Foege (1993) estimated that half of all deaths in the United States are due to unhealthy behaviors, most importantly tobacco use, poor diet and exercise, and excessive alcohol consumption. Even this excludes many health-harming behaviors such as passing up recommended screening tests, discontinuing medication usage, and not following up on physician referrals. Why do people not do the right thing for their health?
The prevailing economic paradigm for understanding these forms of behavior is that health behaviors are investments, where foregone current pleasure leads to improvements in future well-being (Michael Grossman, 1972) . As such, variations in health behaviors will be explained by differences in discount rates or the value of life.
If this theory is right, health behaviors will differ across people, but for a given person, behaviors will be highly correlated: those who value their health highly and care sufficiently about the future will have much better behaviors than those who do not. Table 1 shows the correlation of five different health measures, drawn from the 1990 National Health Interview Survey (NHIS): current smoking; heavy drinking (3 or more drinks per day); being obese (BMI30); using hypertension medication when recommended; and (for women) receiving a mammogram in the past 3 years. In each case, we sample the population aged 45 and older, a group where the health consequences of poor behavior should be salient. The correlations across behaviors are surprisingly low. Smoking and drinking exhibit the largest correlation, but this is only 16 percent. 1 Most correlations are below 10 percent.
The low correlation is not an artifact of this data set or time period. Appendix Table 1 shows analysis of data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance Survey in 2002. This survey includes measures of smoking, drinking, obesity, use of a seatbelt, receipt of a flu shot in the past year, and screening for colorectal, breast, cervical, and prostate cancer. Preventive service receipt is more correlated than is dietary behavior, with roughly 20 percent correlations among these activities. But even 20 percent is not very high, and preventive service use is virtually unrelated to dietary behavior. The individual model of behavior is thus quantitatively not very important.
Even if health behaviors differ generally, individuals might at some point in their lives experience shocks to their discount rates, incomes, or beliefs about the future that will result in large behavioral changes. Thus, year to year changes in health behaviors could be more highly correlated than behavior at any point in time. We examine this proposition using data from the Health and Retirement Study, a sample of nearly 10,000 people nearing retirement age. There are six waves of data available to this point. What, then, are the alternatives? There are three possibilities: health behaviors differ because of differing information; because of genetic differences; and because of situational factors that are specific to the person and behavior. In the remainder of the paper, we examine these different factors.
I. Framework
To understand our analysis, we begin with a simple two-period model of individual choices, where individual i chooses health related actions (denoted j a for action j) to maximize expected discounted lifetime utility:
where i j b reflects the individual-specific current return to the action (net of price),
is the probability of survival to the next period, and i j π is the selfperceived effect of action j on the survival probability. i β is the individual-specific discount rate, and i V is the value to surviving into the next period. The first order condition for action j is:
We assume that
, where i b is the individual tendency to engage in these activities, j b is the average preference for this activity in society, and i j ε is an activity and person-specific idiosyncratic taste. We normalize i b and i j ε to mean zero and assume they are independent of each other and j b . Similarly,
where j π represents the society-wide average belief (which may or may not be correct) and i j µ is an idiosyncratic individual factor with mean zero and no correlation with the other variables. V β is the expectation of
The variance of the action across individuals is given by:
The first term is the heterogeneity related to discount rates or the value of life. The second term relates to the heterogeneity of beliefs about the impact of action j: when people view the behavior in question differentially, this will influence the observed variability in outcomes. The third term reflects heterogeneity in preferences, some of which are common across behaviors and others of which are idiosyncratic.
The correlation across people between observed actions j and k is ( )
The numerator consists of variability in standard investment effects (the first term) and variability in individual preferences (the second term).
The small correlation we observe between different behaviors implies that neither variability in standard investment factors nor in cross-behavior personal preferences is that large -the two together do not top 10 percent of total variability. Understanding the heterogeneity in behaviors requires us instead to understand the variability in perceived health consequences, ) (
Since many of our health outcomes are discrete, rather than continuous, we extend the model to address the continuous outcomes. We assume that there is remains a latent variable j a , and to simplify the discussion, we assume that this latent variable equals
, the idiosyncratic taste for the variable minus the expected health costs.
Individuals undertake the discrete action if and only if j a is positive. Our goal is to assess ( )
, that share of the variance that is accounted for by heterogeneity in investment factors.
To make progress, some assumption about the distribution of the factors is necessary. For simplicity, we assume that both variables are uniform, and we normalize so that 
For discrete outcome k, we similarly assume k a = cluster around .15.
Again, these figures are low and suggest that the bulk of heterogeneity in behaviors cannot be explained by variation in the common investment-related characteristics.
II. Health Beliefs and Health Behaviors
To examine the importance of differing health beliefs, we relate the behaviors That is not to say that the belief measures are without problems. Clearly, they measure true belief with error. More importantly, these beliefs may rationalize, rather than cause behavior. But rationalization would tend to overstate the importance of beliefs. Table 3 shows the relation between beliefs, socioeconomic factors, and health behaviors. 3 For each of the behaviors described above, the first rows report the effect of education and income on engaging in the behavior (also included in the regressions, but not reported, are five year age-sex groups, dummy variables for blacks, other races, and
Hispanics, and a dummy variable for being married).
People who invest more in education generally invest more in health as well;
there is a significant education effect in most regressions. Indeed, the education effect is large; behaviors differ by as much as 10 percentage points between college graduates and high school dropouts. Income is also generally associated with better health. However, the explanatory power of these socioeconomic factors is low. The R 2 's from socioeconomic factors alone are reported in the bottom of the table 4 and range from 2 percent for using hypertension medication to 9 percent for receiving a mammogram on the recommended schedule. These results confirm the low correlations noted in table 1.
Once again, these results are not unique to the data or specific behaviors indicated.
Appendix table 2 shows that the same low R 2 for socioeconomic factors is found in the BRFSS data as well.
The next rows report the coefficients on beliefs. Beliefs are almost always correlated with behavior in the expected way. People who think that smoking or drinking poses a greater risk are unsurprisingly less likely to smoke or drink. The magnitude of these effects ranges up to 15 percentage points for smoking, but is much weaker for the other variables. But again, the ability of these variables to explain individual variation is small. Including belief variables in the regressions increases the R 2 by only 5 percent in the case of smoking, and even less for the other behaviors. Even recognizing that beliefs
are measured with error, the very low explanatory power and possibility for ex post rationalization makes it hard to accept that belief heterogeneity explains differences in individual behaviors.
IV. The Individual vs. the Situation
There are two primary rivals to the economic view of health investments: the genetic view that human heterogeneity is driven primarily by genetic differences, and the psychological view that human choices are driven primarily by randomly-encountered situational differences -a chance encounter with a particular peer group, perhaps, or a random health shock that affects that individual and not others.
Our first attempt to differentiate between these behaviors is to estimate the importance of fixed individual effects in different forms of health behaviors. This is an upper bound on the importance of genetics or other behavior-specific factors. To do this, we use data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). We gauge the importance of individual effects using a random effects regression model, controlling in the model for aggregate year effects. 5
The first column of Table 4 lists the partial-R 2 of the individual effects. The R 2 ranges from 38 percent for vigorous exercise, to nearly 90 percent for body mass index.
Smoking shows a high degree of permanence (79 percent R 2 ) and drinking less (51 percent R 2 ). The high R 2 's for smoking and obesity can be explained by many different theories. Genetics might be important, but so too might be addiction (rational or myopic) or peer effects with relatively stable peer groups.
We consider first the potential importance of neighborhoods. Neighborhoods might matter for health behaviors because of peer effects, or because of correlated shocks such as high or low tax rates on cigarettes. To gauge the importance of neighborhood effects, we have estimated the added R 2 in table 3 that comes from including geographic controls at the Primary Sampling Unit (roughly MSA) level. Addition of the geographic controls raises the R 2 by two to seven percent. 6 The relatively modest explanatory power of area effects suggests that these gross measures of situation are not where the bulk of the situational variation results from.
We can say more about the impact of genetics on health behaviors. The Minnesota Twin Registry 7 has data on many health behaviors among all twins born in Minnesota between 1936 and 1955, nearly 4,000 individuals in total. Following the standard literature on heritability, we compare the correlation of behavior between monozygotic (identical) and dizygotic (fraternal) twins. The genetic contribution to any behavior is twice the difference between the correlation in these groups.
The second column of Table 4 reports the genetic contribution to variability in health behaviors. The highest heritability estimate is for body mass index -72 percent of the variation across people in body mass is estimated to be the result of purely genetic factors. The heritability for other variables is smaller: 26 percent for exercise, 30 percent for smoking and 38 percent for heavy drinking. Comparing columns 1 and 2 of table 4, about one-half of the individual variation in these behaviors results from a genetic predisposition to engage in them.
Our bottom line estimate is that variation in health behaviors results from two primary factors: genetics, and behavior-specific situational influences. We have not to date identified what the relevant situational influences are, but that is clearly a high priority for future research. 1.000
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